In their Social Class in Europe Hugree, Penissat and Spire have performed a useful service. They are fully cognisant – and open – about the methodological (and consequent theoretical) difficulties of measurement across very different European countries. They used the European Socio-Economic Groups (ESEG) classification and ended up with a breakdown into three main social classes: (i) the European dominant class (19%); (ii) the European middle class (38%), and (iii) the European working class (43%). While this is not the place for too much detail I have at the end of this blog appended a breakdown in terms of occupations (covering people in work, 25-65, 2014, EU 27 (excluding Malta)).
The findings of the study should not surprise us. I must restrict myself here to one or two of the more interesting findings and a few comments. My usual grouse applies: given the instruments deployed to measure social class, it is impossible to give character and impact to that fraction of the 1% I have called ‘capital monopolists’ (and others have called the super-rich or the ‘wealth elite’). The authors are up-front about this all too familiar ‘absence’. They specifically mention the emergence of a tiny elite of international financiers who go missing from surveys like theirs.
The super-rich, they state, ‘need allies to ensure that their orders at work will be transmitted and fulfilled, and ultimately to secure their hegemonic position in society’. True enough; and I like Dave Byrne’s term, the ‘concierge class’.
They opt for a concept of the ‘dominant class’, which as indicated comprises 19% of the total. They follow C W Mills in this respect: the dominant class ‘is an ‘alliance’ that encompasses several ‘institutional orders’ which are spatially and historically independent but which are linked to the interests of this globally privileged group. Social order is maintained and reproduced largely because the dominant class is organised in concentric circles, in terms of either financial or cultural capital.’ So their dominant class incorporate Byrne’s concierge class and my ‘capital executive’ + cross-class ‘co-optees’.
The picture of the dominant class reveals, unsurprisingly, a disproportionate access to resources when compared the middle and working classes of Europe. They also appear relatively homogeneous across Europe when compared to the other classes, not least in relation to the construction of the EU (in part out of fear of growing nationalism). They also believe that the primary role of the EU is ‘to improve the competiveness of business rather than the social protection of workers’. However: elites in Central, Eastern and Southern Europe do not have the same relationship with European institutions, nor do they have the same political role within them.
The working class makes up 43% of people at work in Europe. It remains completely absent from EU institutions, and ‘struggles to establish a trade union and political presence at European level’. The authors also note that ‘the many obstacles to unifying its interests and constituting it as a class mobilised in the European arena have worked greatly to the advantage of radical right-wing parties.’ They recall Bourdieu’s call a generation ago for working-class mobilisation at the transnational level. But this has not happened; nor, the authors judge, is it likely to. ‘The mobilisation of social classes within the European space is a much longer and more chaotic process than the movement whereby European leaders have imposed a common economic policy … The need to develop a balance of power favourable to working and middle classes in Europe is more pressing than ever. It is the only way that genuine popular sovereignty can assert itself in the face of the dominance of capital in Europe.’
The authors write: ‘the advantage of considering social classes on the continent ads a whole is that it highlights the characteristics shared by their members regardless of their country of residence. For the working class, there is greater exposure to unemployment and precariousness than in any other social group, more arduous working conditions, a position of economic subordination and relative exclusion from cultural practices such as the mastery of foreign languages or new technologies. Among the dominant classes, despite the income disparities that separate the super-executives in finance from other highly qualified professions, there are many elements of convergence: their members enjoy greater autonomy in the field of work, and can reconcile professional life, family life and leisure more readily than other workers. More fundamentally, they combine economic, cultural, linguistic and political resources, and a majority of them support the project of European integration, unlike the working class. Though representations of society in terms of classes have tended to decline, inequalities between social groups have actually deepened since the 1980s, with cumulative effects for your people, women and minorities.’
They add that ‘the working class appears to be divided between those in the North of the continent, who possess a certain economic affluence as measured by the facilities they enjoy and a still-rising level of qualification, and those in the South and East, who remain confined to situations of poverty and extreme precariousness.’ No surprises here.
These data, only selectively reported here, will surprise no sociologists. But they do put the UK’s Brexit vote into perspective. Those on the left who adopted the longstanding position of opposing the EU as a ‘capitalist club’ and voted for Brexit, may feel vindicated. On the other hand, those on the left who voted Remain on the grounds that Brexit under a Tory government would be worse than staying in the EU to benefit from what paltry shelter exists for the working class in the North may also feel vindicated: The Johnson regime is already proving a nightmare: state authoritarianism, incompetence and corruption being just three products.
Maybe the principal moral of this study is just how difficult it is going to be to generate working-class resistance, both nationally and internationally. The omens are not auspicious.
Definitions: European dominant class (19%): chief executive officers – 1%; senior managers – 3.5%; engineers & specialists in science, engineering & information technology – 5%; doctors & healthcare specialists – 3%; mangers in admin, finance & business – 4%; lawyers, judges, journalists, artists – 2.5%.
European middle class (38%): self-employed hotel & restaurant owners – 1%; shop, hotel & restaurant managers – 1%; teachers – 5%; science, engineering & ICT technicians – 4%; health associate professionals (eg nurses) – 2.5%; sales & admin associate professionals (accountants, sales people etc) – 6%; legal & social associate professionals – 1%; non-commissioned armed forces officers – 0.5%; shopkeepers – 5%; office workers – 7%; receptionists & customer service clerks – 1%; police officers, armed forces personnel & security agents – 1%.
European working class (43%) farmers – 3%; craftsmen – 3.5%; nursing assistants, childcare workers, home care assistants – 3%; skilled construction workers – 2.5%; skilled craft or food & drink industry workers – 1.5%; workers in the metalwork & electronics industries – 5%; machine operators – 3%; drivers – 4%; retail & serviced assistants – 8%; manual labourers – 4.5%; cleaners – 4%; farm labourers – 1%.