It is commonly and correctly asserted that the British aristocracy had lost its political grip by the conclusion of the nineteenth century. The once all-powerful aristocrats had been well and truly displaced by fast-forward bourgeois entrepreneurs. But they did not just fade away.
A report in the Metro (of all places), drawing on research by two academics from South Bank University in London on the wills of nearly 2,000 hereditary title holders, gives perspective. A hereditary title is now apparently worth an average of more than £16 million. Since the Thatcher years, the value has increased fourfold. The report ‘cannily’ speaks of these aristocrats as ‘canny investors’. And that’s the point. Many of these born-lucky parasites are members of the capital executive in their capacity as major shareholders; in fact, some are firmly embedded in that tiny minority – well under 1% of the population – of capital monopolists (namely, those comprising the hard core of the capital executive whose capital is put to use in the interests of further capital accumulation via constraints exercises on national power elites). This is of the essence of what I have called the revised class/command dynamic of financial capitalism. Posed as a formulae, this states that: ‘capital buys power from the power elite of the state to impose and/or shape policy in the interests of its further accumulation’. The influence of class over national states has grown conspicuously during post-1970s financialised capitalism, hence capital monopolists enjoy a greater return on their purchase of policy.
A few more details. On average, Britain’s 600 or so aristocratic families are now as wealthy as their Victorian forebears at the height of Britain’s imperial expansion. The ten largest aristocratic personal fortunes saw the handing on during the last decade of a total of £1.06 billion (on adjustment to reflect current purchasing power). The stand-out examples is of course the 7th Duke of Westminster, who in 2016 inherited a personal fortune worth around £659 million according to 2019 prices. The total wealth of this 28-year old, held in separate trust funds, is estimated at £9 billion.
Lesser figures include the family of John Vane, the 11th Baron Barnard, who presided over a 60,000 acre estate in Northumberland and left £94 million in 2016.
This is in fact a rare glimpse of the ‘closely-guarded secret of the finances of the nations’ dukes, marquesses, earls, viscounts and barons by showing that the minimum value of one of these titles now stands on average at £16.1 million.’ The rise of wealth of the aristocracy shows that it has prospered ‘spectacularly’ under the era of financial deregulation and economic liberalisation ushered in by Thatcher.
The study’s statistics, based on the settled estates or probates of 1,706 members of the nobility dating back to 1858, tells only part of the story ‘by showing the minimal personal wealth of title holders.’ The total is almost certainly considerably higher because typically other family wealth – including land, property and assets like art collections or investment portfolios – remains hidden in separate trusts which defy public scrutiny. But it can be said without fear of contradiction that Britain’s aristocrats successfully weathered the global financial crisis of 2008/9, in part by using their assets to take advantage of low interest rates to buy up stocks and shares and other investments which have since ‘rocketed in value’.
None of this should surprise sociologists, although it remains under-analysed. The data invite – no, demand – comment. I shall restrict myself here to the following, all of which are the progeny of theories and analyses I have been working with and on for 20+ years.
First, my greedy bastards hypothesis (GBH) insisted that the strategic action of the capital executive in general, and capital monopolists in particular, is: (a) THE prime cause of the growing inequalities of wealth and income in financial capitalism, and (b) that this has had the knock-on effect of exacerbating – and constitutes THE prime cause of – the (widening) class gap in healthy lifespans and longevity. I should add that the GBH has been largely ignored by ‘respectable’ (for which read timid, ‘tamed’ or grant-chasing and positivistically inclined) sociologists researching health inequalities.
Second, the data here emphasise the salience of the present ‘financialisation’ of capitalism. Rentiers are to the fore. There is plenty of life after death for Britain’s aristocrats. Finance trumps production, and shareholders can and do frequently purchase and exercise clandestine power. You don’t have to be a CEO to be a winner (though there are plenty of those in the FTSE 100).
Third, just think through the levels of wealth that accrue to those born fortunate and serve to reproduce the obscene luxuries of the class-based status of social and symbolic privilege. It’s well beyond our ken. This of course is why the British monarchy and the honours system must go: they are the props of our Janus-faced ruling class.
Fourth, think through what C W Mills shrewdly called the ‘higher morality’ of the US power elite of the 1950s. We are being played for suckers. It would take thousands of years for people on what passes for a living wage in Britain to ‘earn’ what these aristocrats inherit as a result of being born ‘lucky’ (if that’s the word).
Fifth, ‘ideology’ is key. Ideology for me retains its classical sociological connotation: it denotes a view of the world and its constituent events that reflects an identifiable vested interest. Ideology is thus the enemy of sociology: it is sociology’s task qua social science to expose and counter ideology. The pro-capitalist, neoliberal ideology that expediently diverts attention, shields the wealthy from scrutiny and facilitates their accumulation of capital via class-based ‘exploitation’ and state or command-based ‘oppression’ demands deconstruction.
Finally, and this elaborates on my fifth comment, let’s for once call a spade a shovel, let’s speak plainly. Reflect on ideological proclamations like ‘strivers not scivers!’, a propaganda slogan of Tories like Cameron and Osborne, both of them fortuitous or ‘lucky’ inheritors. Why is it ok to be born a millionaire (ie rich from ‘unearned’ wealth/income), but not ok to be born inheriting nothing, or even in debt, and finding oneself subject to an employment market and welfare system rigged to exploit and oppress, to punish people ‘born unlucky’? It is beyond sad and unfortunate that so many of my colleagues in sociology are baulking at calling out in-your-face exploitation and oppression in a contemporary era of reinvigorated class struggle.